KHVPF Insight
“Some Harm” Is Enough – Supreme Court Lowers Title VII Adverse Action Threshold
For decades, Title VII plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit had to show a “materially adverse” employment setback, like diminished pay or supervisory authority, to state a claim. In its 2024 Muldrow v. City of St. Louis decision, the Supreme Court lowered this bar, holding that only “some harm” is enough.
Muldrow, a police officer, alleged that she was transferred from a specialized intelligence unit to a uniformed patrol position. The transfer, however, did not diminish her pay or her rank. Lower courts held that this was not materially adverse. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It held that, although her pay and rank were unaffected, the transfer resulted in a less-regular work schedule (including weekend work), eliminated her access to a take-home car, and resulted in less networking opportunities and other job perks. That was enough harm to a “term, condition, or privilege of” Muldrow’s employment to state a claim for relief. The Court reasoned that the statutory text of Title VII did not impose a “materiality” standard. It prohibits employers from treating an employee worse because of a protected characteristic—but it doesn’t say how much worse. “Some” injury is all that is required—and Muldrow’s allegations “[met] that test with room to spare.”
Muldrow made clear that—even after its decision—there is still a “test” to be met as to whether some harm has occurred. That leaves open exactly what qualifies. Several lower courts have already held that a mere admonition or reprimand is not enough, and hypothetical fears over changes in career prospects as a result is not enough. It is also unclear whether a change that is merely subjectively disadvantageous to the employee—but objectively neutral or even beneficial—would be enough. The Sixth Circuit has yet to weigh in on these disparate-treatment issues. But it has held that the Muldrow standard applies beyond the disparate-treatment context to hostile environment claims in McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, Ohio.
In McNeal, a former police officer alleged that he had been terminated and subjected to a hostile work environment due to his age. The court affirmed the dismissal of McNeal’s disparate treatment claim but reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the hostile work environment claim. It held that a series of employment actions, including heightened managerial scrutiny, disproportionate disciplinary measures (like counseling and reprimands) and a demeaning work assignment—while not actionable in isolation—could be sufficient when considered collectively to show a “sufficiency severe or pervasive” work environment.
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the traditional framework for evaluating a hostile environment claim. But citing Muldrow, it emphasized that plaintiffs need not show “significant” or “material” harm to meet this standard:
Because hostile-work- environment claims arise out of the same statutory language as disparate-treatment claims, Muldrow’s holding that Title VII does not require plaintiffs to show “significant” harm applies to both types of claims . . . Thus, when we consider whether a hostile work environment was severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII, we effectively ask whether it left an employee “worse off respecting employment terms or conditions.
In short, a hostile environment claim must still be grounded in a term or condition of employment, and the individual harms adding up to the hostile environment need not meet a threshold of materiality. The Sixth Circuit found that the facts presented in McNeil showed a “close call” as to whether the “severe or pervasive” standard was met, and thus enough to require evaluation by a jury.
Muldrow marks a meaningful shift in how courts evaluate Title VII claims. The lowered threshold for showing an adverse employment action may make it easier for employees to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. Employers should therefore reassess how they evaluate and respond to workplace complaints. Practices or decisions that might have not triggered potential liability in the past—like lateral transfers and scheduling changes—might now support a viable claim if connected to a protected characteristic like sex or race. Employers should be diligent in taking steps to mitigate these risks.